Executive Summary

The question posed by Lee Ik-ju in one of his Jigubon Library videos can be summarized in one sentence: “How exactly did nations caught between great powers manage to survive?” To find the answer, we shouldn’t look at “nations that spoke loudly with pride” but rather at “nations that secured tangible benefits, however small, while enduring for the long haul.” This is because diplomacy is not a contest of self-respect but a practice of survival management.

This essay establishes the criteria as “survival (continuity of the state/dynasty) + substantive sovereignty (domestic autonomy) + territorial integrity + economic and cultural autonomy.” Surveying historical periods through this lens yields a relatively clear conclusion: In Korean Peninsula history, the entity that most successfully navigated great power diplomacy was Goryeo, specifically the accumulation of “flexible multi-track diplomacy” spanning from its early period through the Mongol resistance era.

Joseon, in its early period, meticulously constructed a “formalized diplomatic framework (sadae-gyorin)” and demonstrated the capacity to pursue long-term relationship recovery projects (long-term diplomacy with Japan) after wars. However, during the 17th-century transition, there were moments when the “ideological steering wheel” broke the “brakes of reality,” and in the late 19th to early 20th century Daehan Empire period, diplomacy was structurally blocked as the rules of the game (imperialism and modern treaty systems) were completely overturned while facing significant disadvantages in power and internal capacity. In short, Goryeo was like a “team leader who kept the company running while dealing with multiple bosses (great powers) simultaneously,” while late Joseon resembled a “team that lost an entire project because they didn’t realize the company regulations had changed and kept following the old approval chain.”

From Goryeo to the Daehan Empire

Why Did Goryeo’s ‘Multi-Track Diplomacy’ Succeed?

Successful diplomacy is essentially the art of separating “what the other side wants” from “what I must protect at all costs” and skillfully manipulating both. This is precisely where Goryeo excelled. The East Asia that Goryeo faced was not simply “one China,” but a multipolar arena where northern conquest dynasties and central plains dynasties—from Song to Liao to Jin—coexisted and competed. In other words, it wasn’t an alley with just “one big brother” but one with several large brothers. The way to survive in such an alley is singular: before feeling humiliated by one brother, simultaneously manage relationships with others while modulating the signal that “I’m not completely on one side.” Goryeo turned this into a ’technique’ rather than an ’emotion.’

The most famous scene is from 993. The narrative of Seo Hui negotiating in the Khitan military camp to secure the “Gangdong Six Garrisons” is so famous that it actually breeds misconceptions. The point of this incident wasn’t ’eloquence’ but ‘reading the opponent’s objectives.’ The core issue for Khitan (Liao) was the possibility of Goryeo maintaining connections (political ties) with Song. Seo Hui struck at this point while offering promises Goryeo couldn’t immediately keep (short-term ‘security’ signals the opponent wanted) in exchange for securing what Goryeo absolutely needed to protect (tangible territorial benefits). To use a simple analogy: in rent negotiations, when the landlord says “don’t get too friendly with other tenants,” the tenant responds “understood, but fix the boiler.” “Not getting too friendly” is vague, but the boiler is tangible. What Goryeo secured were tangible assets like the boiler (territory, buffer zones, time).

What followed was even more important. Through the first through third Khitan invasions, Goryeo repeatedly learned “diplomacy that fights when necessary and quickly ends wars after fighting.” To prevent battlefield successes like General Gang Gam-chan’s귀주 victory from leading to ‘zero-sum diplomatic victories,’ they quickly pivoted toward restoring justifications and procedures for ending wars. The key here is the ability to operate by separating “form (investiture, era names, tributary relations)” from “substance (domestic affairs, military, territory).” Offering form sometimes means giving up less substance. It’s similar in today’s companies: if you match the report cover (form) that your boss wants, you gain room to design the content (substance) as you wish. Goryeo essentially accomplished this ‘cover management’ at the national level.

Entering the 12th century, Goryeo’s diplomacy became increasingly ‘institutionalized.’ The moment when Liao was replaced by Jin (a great power transition phase) is the most dangerous time for weak nations, yet Goryeo chose to reset relationships with the new hegemon while reducing friction costs rather than unconditionally rejecting their demands. Particularly in relations with Jin, practical matters like diplomatic documents and envoy operations became important—this signals “now it’s not a war of words but a battle of contracts.” Thus, Goryeo established institutions dedicated to diplomatic affairs and engaged in ’textual warfare’ over required documents (seopyo, etc.) to buy time and adjust conditions. In human terms, it’s like moving from just bringing a “friend with good speaking skills” to neighborhood disputes to also bringing a “friend who reads property deeds well.” This bureaucratic, document-centered diplomacy allowed them not to answer “yes/no” immediately when great powers asked “you’re on our side, right?” but to modulate pace by saying “this expression means this, and that expression means that.”

The 13th-century collision with the Mongol Empire (Yuan) was Goryeo’s ‘final boss battle.’ Goryeo demonstrated two things here. First, when facing a completely overwhelming opponent, instead of direct confrontation, they combined terrain, time, and social mobilization in a strategy of endurance. The choice to move the capital to Ganghwa Island was not simple escape but rather “setting up the board to maximize neutralization of the opponent’s advantage (cavalry-centered mobility).” Second, post-resistance negotiations should aim not for ‘complete victory’ but for ‘conditions to survive and open the next round.’ After prolonged resistance, Goryeo reached a peace settlement, and during the subsequent Yuan interference period, they employed even uncomfortable means like royal intermarriage to maintain the dynasty itself. This is difficult to call beautiful. However, viewing diplomacy as survival technique, that discomfort is also an achievement—because they avoided the ending of “national extinction.”

Goryeo’s truly formidable aspect was not missing opportunities when great powers weakened. When Yuan’s power wavered, during King Gongmin’s reign, they pursued anti-Yuan policies to eliminate domestic interference institutions and recover territorial and judicial rights, attempting to ‘renormalize the board.’ In other words, Goryeo treated submission and resistance not as ’emotions’ but as a ’timing game’ aligned with shifts in the international environment. It’s similar to how mid-sized companies renegotiate contract terms when large corporations stumble in today’s markets.

In summary, Goryeo’s great power diplomacy was strong because it simultaneously possessed “distributed operations without all-in commitment to one side,” “separation of form and substance,” “loops of combat-negotiation-order restoration,” “organized document and envoy operations,” and “quick resets following environmental changes.” It’s often compared to tightrope walking, but Goryeo was more like a performer equipped not just with rope but also safety nets (multiple channels) and balancing poles (form/substance separation).

  timeline
    title Major Turning Points in Korean Peninsula External Relations (Summary)
    918  : Goryeo founding
    993  : First Khitan invasion, negotiation and securing Gangdong Six Garrisons
    1019 : Gwigjudaecheop victory, relationship restructuring with Khitan
    1107 : Jurchen expedition, establishment of Nine Fortresses of the Northeast (later returned)
    1126 : Redefinition of relations with Jin, expanded importance of document-envoy diplomacy
    1231 : Beginning of Mongol invasions
    1232 : Capital moved to Ganghwa, prolonged resistance
    1259 : Peace with Mongols
    1270 : Return to Gaegyeong, full-scale Yuan interference period
    1356 : Strengthened anti-Yuan policy, attempts to recover domestic autonomy
    1392 : Joseon founding
    1434 : Northern boundary established through Four Garrisons and Six Forts development
    1592 : Outbreak of Imjin War
    1607 : Relationship recovery with Japan (long-term Tongsinsa diplomacy)
    1619 : Intensified Ming-Later Jin conflict, increased burden of choice for Joseon
    1636 : Byeongja Horan, incorporation into Qing tributary system
    1876 : Ganghwa Treaty, incorporation into modern treaty system
    1882 : Increased great power and Qing interference following Imo Military Mutiny
    1904 : Russo-Japanese War phase, Japanese coerced agreements
    1905 : Eulsa Treaty, deprivation of diplomatic rights
    1907 : Hague Secret Emissary dispatch (international public opinion campaign)
    1910 : Annexation

When Joseon’s and Modernity’s ‘Single Channel’ Faltered

Joseon’s diplomacy is often defined in one phrase: sadae-gyorin. Pay respect to the great power (China) while balancing exchange and restraint with neighbors (Japan, Jurchen, etc.). This principle itself is quite smart. The problem is that when principles become “fixed values,” updates lag when the world changes.

In early Joseon, this system worked well. With Ming as a stable constant, Joseon secured legitimacy, security, and trade channels through this relationship. Simultaneously, in the north, they combined military, migration, and administrative measures to pursue territorial governance (Four Garrisons and Six Forts), taking advantage of fluctuations among Jurchen forces to establish boundaries. This wasn’t diplomacy and military as separate entities but a practical combination where “diplomatic goals (stability) = border operations (field implementation).” In corporate terms, they managed headquarters (Ming) relations well while also directly implementing systems at field branches (northern regions).

Relations with Japan are also interesting. Joseon fundamentally focused on preventing waegu (Japanese pirates) and managing maritime order, utilizing intermediaries (Tsushima) to create a gray zone between ‘complete severance’ and ‘unlimited opening.’ This gray zone is troublesome and constantly generates disputes, but that very troublesomeness serves as a buffer. In diplomacy, buffers are quite valuable assets.

However, the late 16th century revealed that Joseon’s diplomacy heavily depended on the assumption that “the constant (Ming) would last forever.” The Imjin War was an explosion of both ‘gyorin’ failure (misjudging Japanese intentions) and ‘sadae’ dependence (requesting Ming reinforcements). While the war itself was a result of diplomatic failure, post-war diplomacy demonstrated different capabilities. To restore relations with Japan to normalcy, Joseon initiated a long-term project of large-scale cultural and diplomatic missions (Tongsinsa). This involved not simple friendship but an entanglement of information gathering, ritual adjustment, and trade order management. They institutionalized the principle of “don’t cut off contact even after fighting” for nearly 200 years. This section represents quite a high score for Joseon diplomacy.

Where Joseon seriously stumbled was during the 17th-century ‘great power transition phase.’ Coldly speaking, Joseon had only three options between Ming and Later Jin (later Qing): (1) all-in on Ming, (2) acknowledge the new hegemon, or (3) outwardly Ming, inwardly neutral/buffer. Joseon had a king who attempted (3): Gwanghaegun. The problem is that diplomatic success isn’t determined solely by external factors. Sometimes internal politics seizes the diplomatic steering wheel. Gwanghaegun’s neutrality line was attacked internally as a “righteousness issue,” and after regime change (Injo반정), diplomatic direction shifted drastically. Later Jin—Qing then pressured Joseon in a manner of “preemptively eliminating potential enemies.” The Jeonmyo and Byeongja Horans were consequences of this chain.

The Injo period, particularly the Byeongja Horan, remains as an ever-present scene (Namhansanseong, humiliation at Samjeondo) when considering Joseon diplomacy. However, what’s important here isn’t emotional evaluation of “humiliation vs. pride” but analysis of “why diplomatic buffers to prevent war didn’t function.” Faced with the structural change of Ming-Qing transition, Joseon couldn’t internally digest the ‘formal transition’ (acknowledging the new imperial power), and even in debates between peace and anti-Qing factions, ultimately lacked preparation to accept the new order. War resulted, and after the war, they were practically incorporated into the new system of ‘Qing tributary relations.’

The irony is what followed. Though Joseon submitted to Qing, it didn’t immediately collapse. Rather, within subsequent prolonged peace, they maintained considerable domestic autonomy while culturally creating identity mechanisms like ‘So Junghwa’ (Little China) to maintain psychological balance. In other words, 17th-century Joseon diplomacy is more accurately viewed as “a case that paid heavy war costs for failing preemptive transition but succeeded in survival by reorganizing institutions within limited space post-war.”

However, moving into the late 19th century, the rules of the game changed. The tribute-investiture order was a ‘ritual-based order’ centered on formalities and procedures, where weak nations could trade offering form while protecting substance. In contrast, modern imperialism seized not “formalities” but “rights themselves (extraterritoriality, tariff rights, military passage, advisory politics)” through contracts. If the previous world allowed content defense by matching the cover, this new world meant losing ownership of the content itself.

The 1876 Ganghwa Treaty was the moment this door opened. While the treaty proclaimed “Joseon is an autonomous state” upfront, it actually laid a structure eroding sovereignty through clauses like coastal surveys and extraterritoriality. Treaty forms like the 1882 Joseon-US Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation expanded Western-style treaties, but mechanisms like ‘good offices’ didn’t function as expected. Joseon accepted the new phenomenon of treaties with hope that “international norms might protect me,” but those norms ultimately moved only upon power configurations.

After the 1882 Imo Military Mutiny, things became more complex. Qing attempted to repackage traditional tributary relations as something like ‘vassal state’ in modern international law language, while internally, reformists and conservatives clashed over diplomatic direction. This contains all the difficulties of diplomacy: not just two or three great powers, but great powers and domestic politics sitting at the negotiation table simultaneously. At this point, diplomacy becomes not “the state’s position” but “various teams within the state speaking simultaneously with different positions.” In companies, when the sales team sides with Company A, the finance team with Bank B, and the PR team with Media C, negotiations almost always break down.

The decisive blow came during the 1904 Russo-Japanese War phase. Japan, having militarily dominated the Korean Peninsula, coerced various agreements while following step-by-step procedures toward protectorate status, and in 1905, deprived diplomatic rights through the Eulsa Treaty. Gojong attempted an international public opinion campaign. The Hague Secret Emissary incident symbolizes this. Though Yi Jun and others appealed to the international community, great power interests were already tilted. Diplomacy in this period is closer to “the structure for efforts to be effective had nearly disappeared” rather than “tried but failed.” Speaking coldly, Joseon/Daehan Empire didn’t collapse solely from diplomatic incompetence but because—while diplomacy requires minimum military, financial, and administrative capacity (and internal consensus) to function—their foundation was too weak while confronting the most violent wave of expanding imperialism head-on.

Conclusion

If forced to choose one answer to “which nation/period best handled great power diplomacy,” the answer is Goryeo. However, the reason isn’t that “Goryeo was always right” but “because Goryeo had the widest toolkit for weak nation survival diplomacy and actually operated it through multiple great power transition phases.”

Goryeo’s achievements stem from: (1) distributing channels without fixing to one side in a multipolar system, (2) distinguishing and operating the trade between form (tributary relations, investiture, era names, tribute) and substance (domestic affairs, territory, military), (3) designing to include ‘war-ending diplomacy,’ (4) accumulating organizational capacity like documents, envoys, and institutions, and (5) possessing a ‘reset sense’ to attempt sovereignty recovery when Yuan weakened.

Early Joseon performed extremely well. Sadae-gyorin was a cost-efficient operating system in a stable international order, and border governance like the Four Garrisons and Six Forts exemplified implementing diplomatic goals as ‘field systems.’ The tenacity of long-term Tongsinsa diplomacy after Imjin War also deserves recognition. However, during the 17th-century transition, there were moments when ideology overwhelmed reality, paying war costs for it.

Evaluating modern Joseon/Daehan Empire’s failure requires more caution. Choices like Geomundo neutrality theory, expectations of good offices mediation, and Hague Secret Emissaries were also “attempts to grasp new tools (international law, public opinion campaigns) understanding rules had changed.” However, these attempts were repeatedly blocked by contemporary great powers’ ‘agreed ignorance’ and insufficient internal capacity. It wasn’t that diplomacy failed but rather resembles discovering locked doors while searching for emergency exits until the last moment in a space where diplomacy could barely function.

Thus the conclusion crystallizes: Goryeo most realistically embodied “how to survive among great powers”; Joseon “performed very well in stable orders but paid costs when updates lagged during order inversions”; and the Daehan Empire period represented “an entity that had to simultaneously change players and conduct training after game rules changed but lacked both time and stamina.” If viewing diplomacy not as ‘style’ but as ‘survival technique,’ Goryeo deserves the highest score in Korean Peninsula history.

Reference List