The Structure That Makes KOSDAQ Bio a Rollercoaster
When discussing KOSDAQ bio in Korean stock markets, the atmosphere is always peculiar. Some days it becomes “future food,” other days “a community of those caught at peaks.” This temperature difference is closer to a structural problem than an emotional one. KOSDAQ inherently has high growth stock proportions, and among them, bio is an industry “priced by events rather than earnings.” A single Phase 2 clinical data point, one technology export disclosure, one rights offering can split a company’s next 2-3 years. So both indices and individual stocks show frequent ‘discontinuous jumps’ rather than ‘continuous flows.’
This structure is also sensitive to policy and market regulation changes. Recently, financial authorities announced strengthened KOSDAQ delisting of underperforming firms, even revealing simulation results suggesting delisting candidates could significantly increase. In other words, KOSDAQ becomes both “a market where good companies stand out more” and simultaneously “a market where bad companies fall off quickly.” From investors’ perspectives, this is positive news while also being material that amplifies short-term volatility.
Nevertheless, moments arise when KOSDAQ regains attention. Especially when indices jump strongly, ‘policy + theme + large-cap concentration’ often occurs simultaneously. Indeed, reports emerged of KOSDAQ breaking through the 1,000 mark with large movements in late January 2026. The point in this phase isn’t “all stocks rallying simultaneously” but “a phenomenon of buying compressed into top momentum stocks and specific sectors.” The gap between ‘felt markets’ and ‘index markets’ commonly mentioned.
In such markets, the core question for understanding KOSDAQ bio condenses to one: Does money flow only to ’new drug success’ or also to ‘platforms/infrastructure’? And the way global pharmaceutical companies are moving now tilts heavily toward the latter.
Why Global Big Pharma Looks at K-Bio
Global big pharma is now ‘chased by timelines.’ Representatively, Merck’s immuno-oncology drug Keytruda (pembrolizumab) has overwhelming sales scale and faces a major event of patent expiration (intensifying competition), in a typical “throne defense” phase. So big pharma obsesses over ’technologies that change the form’ of existing blockbusters as much as creating new drugs. Converting intravenous (IV) to subcutaneous (SC) injections to reduce administration time improves hospital operational efficiency and changes patient experience. Simultaneously, it allows drawing more defensive lines through product lifecycle management (new formulations, new combinations).
This flow is also confirmed through actual approvals. The US FDA approved pembrolizumab combined with hyaluronidase subcutaneous formulation (Keytruda Qlex) on September 19, 2025. Bristol Myers Squibb also received approval for nivolumab combined with hyaluronidase subcutaneous formulation (Opdivo Qvantig) on December 27, 2024.
An interesting point emerges here. Big pharma acquires or locks in long-term contracts with enzyme/formulation platforms enabling new ‘administration methods’ as much as immediately buying “new mechanism drugs.” This is the first axis.
The second axis is modality (therapeutic approach) transition. In the cancer therapeutics arena, the hot keyword remains antibody-drug conjugates (ADC). The idea of attaching a ‘warhead’ (potent cytotoxic drug) to a ‘guided missile’ (antibody) to target cancer cells—success depends on target selection and linker/payload design. So big pharma experientially learned that “internal development alone won’t speed up” ADCs, actively pulling in external platforms and pipelines.
The third axis is the next round of immuno-oncology. While the PD-1/PD-L1 class made innovations, not all patients respond. ‘Primary resistance that doesn’t work from the start’ is significant, and ‘secondary resistance that works initially then leaks later’ is common. So attempts to find combination therapies and new immune checkpoint targets continue.
In summary, what big pharma wants isn’t “because it’s Korean bio” but (1) platforms accelerating blockbuster formulation conversions, (2) engines of high-value modalities like ADC, (3) new targets for immuno-oncology post-PD-1. KOSDAQ companies holding these three elements are closer to the reality of being ’eyed.’
Platforms Create Big Deals
Platform companies’ appeal is simple. New drugs are usually “shot by shot,” but platforms become “multiple products once laid down.” From big pharma’s perspective, platform contracts resemble factory facility investments. Not facilities for just one product, but facilities enabling rapid production of entire future lineups.
Formulation Conversion Platform: Alteogen
The case that most directly created a ‘global event’ in subcutaneous conversion is Alteogen. With Keytruda Qlex approval in the US, “subcutaneous Keytruda” became no longer rumor or expectation but a commercial product recognized by regulatory authorities. And Reuters reports explicitly mentioned that the enzyme used in this subcutaneous Keytruda is Korean company (Alteogen) technology.
Alteogen’s development shows chronologically how ’technology’ converts to ‘purchase orders.’ First, in March 2025, AstraZeneca made an official announcement that it secured rights to develop/commercialize subcutaneous formulations of multiple oncology assets using Alteogen’s ALT-B4 (hyaluronidase-based) technology. Then in November 2024, it announced an ALT-B4-based Enhertu subcutaneous formulation development and commercialization contract with Daiichi Sankyo.
And in January 2026, a formulation conversion contract with GSK’s oncology subsidiary Tesaro was announced. This contract involves developing dostarlimab (Jemperli) subcutaneous formulation using ALT-B4, announced in a structure where Alteogen receives upfront payments, milestones (maximum), and royalties.
This sequence means one thing: “Platforms,” when successful, can create ‘chain contracts.’ When big pharma validates one company’s technology once, the incentive to horizontally apply it to next assets is strong. Conversely, from investors’ perspective, when “the moment of platform validation” becomes important. Events like US FDA approval are precisely that ‘hard evidence of validation.’
Of course, risks exist. Formulation conversion comes with patent/patent dispute issues. Merck’s subcutaneous Keytruda has been mentioned alongside potential patent disputes with Halozyme Therapeutics, and Reuters reports also mentioned Merck’s stance that legal issues won’t delay launch. It means platform business must evaluate both “technology excellence” and “rights stability.”
Brain Delivery Platform: ABL Bio
The second platform axis is “how to cross the blood-brain barrier (BBB).” The brain has strong protective barriers making drugs difficult to enter. So BBB shuttles create big opportunities in neurodegenerative diseases or brain tumors. The KOSDAQ company conspicuously receiving ‘big pharma stamps’ in this field is ABL Bio.
In April 2025, ABL Bio announced a Grabody-B (brain delivery platform) licensing agreement with GSK, presenting upfront/milestone/royalty structures at very large scales. Then in November 2025, it announced a multi-program collaboration agreement utilizing the Grabody platform with Eli Lilly and Company. End-December saw re-announcements of fund inflows (upfront + equity) including upfront payments and equity investments.
Such contracts provide important hints to investors. When big pharma takes a platform, the speed of ‘plugging’ that platform into their own pipelines becomes key. Platforms see signals accumulate over long periods across partners’ multiple pipelines rather than exploding in one clinical result. So for platform companies, looking at “contract quality (rights scope, target numbers, joint research structure, supply responsibilities)” is more realistic than “single clinical success.”
ADC Engine: Legochem Biosciences
Viewing ADC as merely ’the latest fashion in cancer treatment’ is only half the story. The essence is a complex industry of manufacturing, design, and validation, and good ADCs require “targeting antibody,” “drug payload,” and “conjugation technology” to align simultaneously. Due to this complexity, big pharma prefers external partners with validated platforms.
The representative KOSDAQ case on this axis is Legochem Biosciences. End-2023 saw company announcements of concluding licensing agreements with Janssen Biotech for Trop2-targeted ADC (LCB84), with disclosed total contract scale (maximum) including upfront structure.
Another axis is the Ono Pharmaceutical contract. In October 2024, Ono officially announced licensing of ADC candidate (LCB97) and ConjuAll platform-based joint research/licensing collaboration with Legochem. And in January 2026, the company re-announced expected milestone receipts following developmental progress of that contract.
Investment points in ADC business usually don’t end at “contract disclosure.” The real game is partners specifying targets, progressing preclinical/clinical work, intermediate data emerging, and next options exercising there. In other words, ADC platform companies look like ‘order-taking industries’ but actually are industries strongly tied to “partner development success rates.” So having many contracts isn’t unconditionally good—which partners, with which targets, to which stages becomes more important.
Post-PD-1, Next Immuno-Oncology Targets and STCube’s Position
Immuno-oncology isn’t a genre ending with PD-1/PD-L1. While PD-1 class being game-changers is correct, response rates being limited and resistance being common on monotherapy basis has been repeatedly noted. So new mechanisms for “patients unresponsive to PD-1” or combination therapies continuously remain necessary.
Along this extension, a new immune checkpoint target called BTN1A1 emerges. BTN1A1 is a butyrophilin family protein, and according to research results, it’s related to T-cell activation inhibition and can appear mutually exclusively with PD-L1 expression. And results showing tumor growth inhibition and increased immune cell infiltration in animal models when BTN1A1 was antibody-blocked have been presented.
The Korean company clinically advancing this target is STCube. STCube announced through October 2025 company disclosure that it received Phase 2 clinical trial plan (IND) approval for BTN1A1-targeted immuno-oncology candidate ‘Nelmastobat’ in non-small cell lung cancer (advanced/metastatic). Specific disclosure included biomarker-based targeting of BTN1A1 expression-positive patients (TPS ≥ 50%) and design as docetaxel combination.
Here, the investment-wise most important question isn’t “whether it’s a new target.” Whether the new target works with ‘patient selection’ in clinical settings. If the hypothesis that BTN1A1 can be mutually exclusive with PD-L1 proves true, this becomes a strategy targeting the commercial/clinical empty space called “patient populations unresponsive to PD-1.” STCube’s clinical design moving with biomarker basis reflects this directionality.
However, this area has much more linear failure risk unlike platform business. Platforms ‘distribute across multiple assets,’ but new drug targets ‘concentrate in one or two clinicals.’ So when investing in new drug development bio, “logic of clinical design and company stamina (funds, pipeline diversification) when failing” becomes a more realistic defense line than “story originality.”
So Which KOSDAQ K-Bio Do Global Pharma Eye?
Translating the expression ’eyeing’ into investor language usually means two things: (1) already contractually bound, or (2) having contractable forms (data/platforms/regulatory events). Based on the above flows, meaningful “global eyeing types” in KOSDAQ organize into roughly four categories.
First, companies whose platforms entered ‘monetization stage’ through regulatory approvals. Alteogen has strong evidence called US FDA approval of subcutaneous Keytruda, with confirmed official announcements of contracts with multiple partners like AstraZeneca, GSK (Tesaro), and Daiichi Sankyo.
Second, companies with platforms entering fields big pharma views as “long-term battlegrounds” (brain/CNS). ABL Bio already proved “technology plugging into global pipelines” in forms of Grabody-B contract with GSK and multi-program collaboration with Lilly.
Third, companies with ADC engines. Legochem Biosciences is a case where “structures where big pharma spends money” are repeatedly confirmed, like major deals with Janssen and contracts with Ono plus milestone receipt announcements.
Fourth, companies clinically advancing new immuno-oncology targets post-PD-1. STCube’s BTN1A1-targeted Nelmastobat, though still early stage, points to attacking “the empty space PD-1 left” as a new mechanism and targeting unmet needs through biomarker-centric clinical design.
And one more bonus track exists. Not new drugs or platforms but companies becoming ’the eyes and ears of bio’. Medical AI like digital pathology and biomarker prediction enters here. For example, Lunit announced collaboration with AstraZeneca on digital pathology tools like NSCLC genetic mutation prediction, and company IR materials prominently feature collaboration with global pharma/diagnostic networks. From big pharma’s perspective, such tools become “devices to quickly select good patients and pass clinicals faster.”
In other words, “companies globally eyed” narrows down not simply to ‘researching well’ but having weapons usable immediately that mesh with big pharma’s timelines (patents, commercialization, clinical speed).
The Real Meaning of Investing Knowingly in KOSDAQ Bio
“Investing knowingly” in KOSDAQ bio isn’t actually having fancy analytical models. It’s closer to the ability to distinguish exactly three things.
First, distinguishing platform-type revenue (repeatedly applied to multiple assets) from single new drug-type revenue (concentrated in one or two clinicals). For platform types, contracts, supply, and partner development progress become core KPIs. Alteogen, ABL Bio, Legochem Biosciences sides fit better viewed through this frame. Meanwhile, new immuno-oncology targets like STCube have clinical design/patient selection/data as the main game.
Second, distinguishing ’levels’ of regulatory events. Academic posters/early data change atmosphere, but events accompanying regulatory authority decisions like FDA approval change game rules. Indeed, subcutaneous Keytruda’s approval and market introduction plans connect with Merck’s strategy fronting ‘products reducing administration time to minutes.’ Such events qualitatively change platform companies’ negotiation power.
Third, treating fundraising and delisting risk as ’leading variables’ not ’lagging variables’. Clinicals grow by eating money. Rights offering or fundraising disclosures in bio aren’t “shameful matters” but “survival and speed fuel.” However, large-scale capital increases during bad market environments cause significant stock price shocks, and in phases where listing abolition requirements policy-wise strengthen, ‘underperforming’ labels become more dangerous.
Ultimately, in KOSDAQ bio, the phrase ‘global pharma eyeing’ translates for investors as: (1) Has global money already entered (contracts/approvals), (2) Is there structure for entry (platforms/clinical design), (3) Does stamina remain to utilize entry (funds/portfolios), (4) What are dispute/regulatory risks post-entry (patents, rights, listing regulations). Those simultaneously checking these four items are closest to “investing knowingly.”