What Has Been Confirmed and What Remains Unknown

In mid-January 2026, a South Korean research team announced securing “high-concentration rare earth” samples from the deep seabed of the western Pacific high seas. The most important fact is this: it’s closer to “extracted sediment (mud) through coring that showed quite high rare earth concentrations” rather than “found a commercially viable mine.” According to the announcing entity’s materials, samples collected in July 2025 via piston coring at approximately 5,800m depth showed maximum 3,100ppm and average over 2,000ppm concentrations.

Here, the number “2,000ppm” itself governs the news atmosphere. ppm is parts per million, and 2,000ppm is 0.2%. While seemingly small, considering that ‘rare earths’ generally have the characteristic of “no profit if not abundant (or if separation is too difficult),” such figures become sufficiently ‘signals worth further verification.’ However, signals are just signals. A few samples showing high concentration is completely different from “how widely and thickly that high-concentration layer spreads (resource volume).” So reports note the research team also previewed conducting secondary exploration to reinforce precise data and create ‘resource map’-like results.

Another key point is that the story becomes complicated the moment “high seas” attaches. Using a dining table analogy, just because someone representatively went shopping doesn’t make that table their property. Under international norms, high seas deep-seabed minerals are difficult for specific nations to pre-empt like territory, requiring separate international management systems (the International Seabed Authority explained later).

At this point comes the question “Still good news, right?” It can be good news. However, the type of good news is closer to “Korea fastened the first button of predicting areas with high rare earth enrichment probability in high seas deep seabed and confirming through actual drilling” rather than ‘jackpot to immediately extract and use.’

Why It’s Likely ‘Rare Earth-Rich Mud’ Rather Than ‘Rare Earth Ore Veins’

‘Rare earths’ is too strong a name. It automatically evokes scenes of mining sparkling ore with pickaxes. However, what actually draws attention in deep seabed nowadays is generally “sediments” rather than “veins.” Academia commonly discusses REY (rare earth elements + yttrium) as a bundle, and interest surged when 2011 research published in Nature Geoscience showed through data (analyzing over 2,000 samples) that “deep-sea mud in various Pacific locations contains high REY concentrations.”

This flow continued into projects represented by “REY-rich mud around Japan’s Minamitorishima.” A 2018 Scientific Reports paper discusses that REY-rich mud exceeding 5,000ppm was confirmed near Minamitorishima (the paper mentions 2013 discovery) and that mineralogical characteristics could be attractive from a resource perspective.

Why can ‘mud’ become a resource? The key is “where rare earths attach.” Terrestrial ores have rare earths in specific minerals (e.g., bastnäsite, monazite), and the separation/refining process carries large costs and environmental burdens. Conversely, there’s a hypothesis that rare earths can exist in relatively easier-to-recover forms in deep-seabed sediments, and research has accumulated that materials like ‘biogenic apatite (e.g., fish teeth/bone fragment apatite, bioapatite)’ can be major ‘homes’ capturing rare earths.

Types with “high heavy rare earth (heavy rare earth) proportions” are particularly attractive in this process. The reason is simple: high-performance permanent magnets (NdFeB series) for electric vehicle motors or wind power need heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium to elevate ‘heat-resistant performance’ alongside light rare earths like neodymium.

This Korean announcement also presents logic that “seabed rare earth mud may have high heavy rare earth content and low radioactive element content.” This is closer to connecting REY-rich mud general theory and existing literature flows to Korean exploration results rather than an independently sufficiently verified conclusion about ‘Korean areas.’ Therefore, more important questions going forward add one more number: “How thick is this sediment layer?”, “How large is the area?”, “Under what conditions and at what yield is recovery processing possible?”

The Rule That High Seas Deep-Seabed Resources Can ‘Belong to No One’ and ISA’s Threshold

The reason deep-seabed mining news always slides into ’legal talk’ at the end is simple: high seas deep seabed is where general territorial concepts don’t reach.

The UN system’s International Seabed Authority is precisely the institution managing exploration and development activities of mineral resources in that ‘floor outside territory’ (what UNCLOS calls “Area,” seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil outside national jurisdiction). UNCLOS Article 136 declares that Area and resources as “common heritage of mankind,” and Article 137 nails down that no state can claim sovereignty over that area.

Realistically, ISA grants “exploration contracts,” and entities with contracts (usually not individual companies but states or state-sponsored entities) gain exclusive rights to collect data in certain areas. However, this ’exclusivity’ is not ownership but rights permitted under defined rules for limited periods and conditions. Exploration contracts ISA manages have mainly operated classified as polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides, and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts.

At this point, the legal meaning of “Korea found rare earths in high seas” crystallizes: ‘finding’ in high seas itself is possible, but moving to commercial development requires passing gates like authority, regulations, environmental requirements, and benefit-sharing within the ISA system. And assessments continue that ISA hasn’t yet completed final ‘Exploitation Regulations (commonly called Mining Code)’ for commercial mining. The US Congressional Research Service also specifies that “ISA has not yet adopted a regulatory framework for seabed mineral mining (extraction) and consequently has not issued exploitation contracts.”

Moreover, after the 2021 ’two-year rule’ trigger in ISA, tensions continue between political pressure around regulation-making speed and claims that “mining shouldn’t start before regulations are complete.” ISA’s own FAQ explains what the two-year rule is and why it became contentious.

Adding the BBNJ (nicknamed ‘High Seas Biodiversity Agreement,’ High Seas Treaty) that entered force January 17, 2026, the flow of strengthening environmental impact assessments (EIA) and protected area discussions for any high seas activities thickens further. However, commentary notes this treaty focuses more on strengthening biodiversity protection frameworks rather than directly regulating seabed mineral mining itself, with seabed minerals still remaining ISA’s central axis.

Summarizing: high seas deep-seabed rare earths are forced into the sequence “discovery (precisely high-concentration sample confirmation) → new authority acquisition competition → international regulations/environmental standards/technology verification → only then money talk” rather than “discovery → immediate development.”

The Technical Meaning and Cost Sense of ‘Continuously’ Raising Mud from 5,800m

Deep-seabed resource discussions keep appearing as ‘politics on maps,’ but actually ’engineering under ships’ is what holds them back. 5,800m depth means roughly several hundred atmospheres of pressure, and from equipment’s perspective, it’s precisely the environment for “unattended breakdowns.” So exploration-stage coring is literally closer to “tests extracting a few meters of mud samples,” while production stage is closer to “factory operations pulling up hundreds to thousands of tons of sediment daily for sorting and processing.” The distance between the two is far larger than expected.

A recent Japanese case shows this abstract distance as reality. Early February 2026, reports emerged that the Japanese government and JAMSTEC succeeded in test-nature work “continuously pulling up” rare earth-containing mud from approximately 6,000m depth using the deep-sea drilling vessel Chikyu. Reuters conveyed specifics including work period (January 30-February 1, 2026), locations (3 sites), and post-recovery analysis schedules, with the Japanese government also mentioning this work’s significance for supply chains.

This case provides good comparison. If Korea’s announcement is “confirmed high-concentration layers,” Japan is closer to “tested equipment and operating scenarios capable of raising.” In other words, engineering-wise, they opened one more ‘door of possibility.’ However, money doesn’t immediately follow here either. Technical demonstration isn’t immediately economic viability, and economic viability isn’t immediately social acceptance (environmental/international regulations) either.

Let’s do very rough math to grasp economic viability sense. If average 2,000ppm (0.2%), to obtain 1 ton of rare earths (or REY) purely by mass basis, ’theoretically’ requires lifting 500 tons of mud. 500 tons equals dozens of large trucks’ worth. Of course, actual processes have all variables like concentration/sorting efficiency, target element (specific heavy rare earths like dysprosium) ratios, recovery rates, moisture content, and impurity processing costs. So the important conclusion here isn’t the numbers themselves but the question’s direction: the real gate becomes “how long can that volume be rotated at that depth, at that cost, meeting those environmental standards” rather than “is mining possible.”

And rare earths don’t end with ’extraction.’ Separation/refining is the real industry waist. China’s influence at this stage being very large is why deep-seabed resource discussions directly connect to supply chain strategies.

The Reality of ‘China-Centered’ Supply Chains and Where South Korean Government Measures’ Grain Changes

Understanding rare earth supply chains often makes “where magnets come from” more important than “where elements are.” International Energy Agency data publicly shows very high Chinese proportions in rare earth magnet production.

The US Geological Survey (MCS 2025) also numerically shows major import sources of rare earth ‘compounds and metals’ heavily concentrated in China (though US-based, it’s material revealing the structural problem of ‘refining/processing stage concentration’).

South Korea’s situation is more intuitive. Diagnoses repeatedly note that commercially operating rare earth mines domestically are virtually nonexistent, and industry has structures vulnerable to external shocks in imports, processing, and components (especially permanent magnets). The National Assembly Futures Institute presents assessments that Korea generally depends on overseas for critical minerals, with some minerals’ China dependence exceeding 90%.

Policy also moves premised on that vulnerability. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy announced ‘Comprehensive Rare Earth Supply Chain Measures’ on February 5, 2026, with the core being directions to manage “upstream (overseas resource development)–midstream (separation/refining)–downstream (production/re-resourcing)” full cycles as one bundle. Particularly designating all 17 rare earth types as critical minerals and including expanded overseas resource development financial support, domestic production facility investment subsidies, and new R&D fund establishment.

This announcement is interesting because it contains realism of “managing risks by expanding trade cooperation channels with China short-term” simultaneously rather than just the slogan “de-China.” Reuters conveys Korea strengthening cooperation with China separately from US-led critical minerals consultative body movements while mentioning specific mechanisms like hotlines and joint committees.

Reviving roles of public institutions like the Korea Mine Rehabilitation and Mineral Resources Corporation to have the public partially absorb ‘failure risks’ of overseas exploration and development ties in here. This is policy acknowledging the fact of “high-risk markets where nobody can run if left only to private sector.”

Connecting this flow to ‘deep-seabed rare earth exploration’ converges to one conclusion: securing rare earths from deep seabed isn’t simply finding one more raw material but a long-term project where government, public, and private sectors together lay a new path connecting “raw materials–refining–products–recycling.” And that project’s success will likely be determined by much more terrestrial indicators like refining technology, magnet industry, re-resourcing ecosystems, and inventory/stockpile operations rather than one deep-seabed area’s concentration.

Environment and Social Acceptance: Where ‘Future Resources’ Can Become ‘Future Costs’

Deep-seabed mining often breeds the misconception ‘it’s okay since no one lives there.’ However, what science and policy repeatedly say is the exact opposite: “Deep seabed just lacks human habitation; ecosystems live there, and humans still don’t know well” is more accurate.

The representative issue is sediment plumes. Concerns are large that when scraping or suctioning the bottom, fine particles can spread extensively, with effects reaching not just bottom organisms but mid-water column ecosystems. 2025 Nature, Nature Communications, and Nature series papers have accumulated evidence through actual tests and observations that “impacts can persist long-term (at least decade scales) or biological communities can remain transformed.”

Reuters conveyed research results observing decades-later impacts from 1979 test mining and growing flows of ‘moratorium (suspension/halt) demands’ based on this.

Civil society and policy pressure also grows. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) specifies that the 2021 General Assembly adopted resolutions demanding deep-seabed mining moratorium and has requested halts until standards and regulations are established.

In other words, the moment deep-seabed rare earths become ‘possible resources,’ the question of whether they can become ’legitimate resources’ wedges in. ISA regulation completeness, environmental impact assessment reliability, and data disclosure and international negotiation transparency determine business viability as much as technology.

Conclusion: Closer to “We Must Grow From Now” Rather Than “We Planted”

The announcement of securing high-concentration rare earth samples from western Pacific high seas deep seabed is certainly interesting. Especially if exploration processes like “predicting promising points data-based and hitting them with actual coring” were confirmed, long-term this could connect to capability accumulation and negotiation power (authority acquisition competition in ISA systems) in this field.

However, this news’s real meaning lies in ‘sequence’ rather than the word ‘discovery.’ First, this is ‘sediment layers’ not ‘mines,’ and resource volume will be determined by future exploration. Second, high seas deep seabed is tightly held by international norms, so gates of “authority, regulations, benefit-sharing” wait before technology. Third, 5,800m is the depth where ‘possibility’ hardest becomes ‘viable business,’ and even reaching continuous recovery like Japan’s case, economic viability is a separate test. Fourth, even if raw materials exist, if failing to grasp supply chain waists like refining, magnets, and recycling, resources remain ‘dots on maps.’ So government measures also move toward designing full-cycle (upstream~downstream) bundles. Fifth, environmental and social acceptance boundaries are drawn far more aggressively than before, and speed races in situations with incomplete regulations easily invite international backlash.

Ultimately, the sentence “planted rare earths in the Pacific” is actually closer to “picked up one seed in the Pacific to verify if rare earths will grow.” What’s needed to grow seeds into trees isn’t just shovels (mining equipment). Law (ISA), fertilizer (refining/processing), weather (diplomacy), and even ’neighborhood meetings on whether planting this tree in this garden is okay’ (environmental/social consensus) are all required.

References

• Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources (KIGAM) press releases/notices (Tanhae-3 No.1 exploration results: 5,800m depth, maximum 3,100ppm/average 2,000ppm, piston coring)
• Korean media reports (mentions of secondary exploration and ‘resource map’ plans, high seas resources/ISA context)
• UNCLOS original text (Part XI: Area, common heritage, non-appropriation declaration)
• ISA official materials (exploration contract structure, two-year rule explanation, exploration contract classification)
• CRS report (ISA non-adoption of mining regulations and non-issuance of exploitation contracts summary)
• Academic research (Pacific deep-seabed REY-rich mud concept and distribution: Nature Geoscience 2011, Scientific Reports 2018, etc.)
• Japanese deep-seabed rare earth mud recovery test (Reuters and government/agency briefings)
• BBNJ (High Seas Treaty) entry into force and scope (including commentary that seabed mining is ISA territory)
• Supply chain data (IEA rare earth magnet proportions/exports and USGS MCS)
• Korean government ‘Comprehensive Rare Earth Supply Chain Measures’ (designating 17 rare earth types as critical minerals, finance/investment/R&D/re-resourcing)
• Deep-seabed mining environmental impact evidence (long-term impacts, plumes, recovery time: Nature series, Reuters, EASAC, IUCN)